

THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL PRACTICE AND THE CALL FOR STATE POLICE

EGUNJOBI, A.A.

Department of Political Science
College of Education,
Lanlate, Oyo State.
(Tundeogundele72@Gmail.Com)

ABSTRACT

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, the Nigerian Police had found itself enmeshed in one controversy or the other especially as it concerns the role it plays in enforcing politically motivated dictates of the federal government. The over centralization of the Nigeria Police against all known principle and practice of federalism has made it a tool for political intimidation of opposition politicians by the wielders of the power of the federal government. Similarly, centralization has made the deployment of the police to rapidly address crimes and criminality ineffectual considering the vastness of the Nigerian space and its attendant challenges of diversity occasioned by the numerity of the ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages making up the country. This situation has led to continuous call for the decentralization the Nigerian Police through constitutional devolution of the powers to establish, organize, maintain and control the police by subnational units making up the Nigerian federation. This paper looks at the general principle of federalism, the notion of policing, the historical development of Nigeria Police, its performance in critical moment of political uncertainty, its limitations and the call for state police.

Keywords: Federalism, State Police, Constitution and Democracy

Introduction

Nigeria's Fourth Republic which was inaugurated on 29 May 1999 heralded at that time high expectation that the level of political tension that existed in the run-up to this period will reduce. This has however remained a mirage. Indeed the constitutional basis for Nigeria's Fourth Republic has become a major bone of contention in itself.

The most serious challenge with the 1999 constitution is that it has not responded to the persistent demand for a political restructuring of the country despite a couple of attempts at constitution amendment. The demands have been for curbs on the powers of the federal government and the enhancement of the powers of the state and local government.

The drift toward unitarism has led to the failure of Nigerian federalism. Successive regimes at the centre in Nigeria have accumulated powers over time such that subnational units had become weakened to act in certain regards including on the issue of adequately policing themselves through an instrument directly established, maintained and controlled by them. Civil rule notwithstanding, instance of conflict still abound since May 1999 on the issue of state police and this has shown that both the constitution bequeathed to this Republic and the lack of the political will by the operators of this constitution to achieve cooperation through political bargaining and compromise are generating tension in the polity. Given the traditional notion of federalism and the practice of Nigerian federation, the Nigerian Police as a centralized instrument for the maintenance of law and order is a misnormal. The logic of

federalism requires that subnational units should be able to enforce their laws, fight crime and maintain law and order (see Sections 11(2) and 215(4) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), but the absence of State Police for the States to undertake these functions is an obvious contradiction of the basic principle of federalism.

What is State Police?

State police has been defined as a police formation under State authority rather than under the authority of a city or county in the State. It has also been defined as the police organized maintained by a State as distinguished from those of a lower state sub-division (as a city or county) of the State Government (Mersim, 2012). However, in the particular case of Nigeria, state police is a kind of sub-national police formation which is established, organized, maintained and under the direct control and jurisdiction of a particular state (sub-national unit) government.

Understanding the theory and principle of federalism

The theory of federalism and the principle underlying federal practice is that, it is a system of government or arrangement power that is deliberately crafted to deal with sociologically complex polity with multi-linguistic and multi-religious composition. (Wheare, 1964).

Oyovbaire (1979) observed that, the existence of federalism presupposes the existence of certain compelling and propellant forces which theoretically at least, are absent from its opposite phenomenon called unitary system. The idea of federalism seeks to cope with the central problem of territorial distribution of power in such a manner that guarantees unity in diversity.

Central to federalism is the formal division of power between levels of government, an issue that preoccupies the attention of Wheare (1964) whose classical formulation on the federal principle has been subjected to several criticisms among which are the suggestions that it fails to distinguish between an idea and its institutional manifestations, and that it sets up the experience of the United State of America as the ideal type of federal system (Duchacek, 1970). Despite such objections, it remains central to the discourse on federalism that it is the legal – constitutional arrangement that provide indication to the legal and political competence of levels of government.

Constitutional federalism attempts to build on the sociological factor which, in the first place, necessitates the adoption of federalism (Freidrich, 1968). The strength of this perspective on the changing and evolving nature of federalism, which has been illustrated by the experience of the United States of America where the federal experiment has evolved through critical phases such as *centralizing*, then *competitive* and, ultimately, *co-operative* federalism. Oyovbaire (1985) while commenting on this perspective noted that, the American experiences is the changing relationship between the federal content..., [and] the gradual withering away of two separate communities or citizenships in federal systems. In their place is the emergence of one body of citizenship, one nationality, requiring the exercise of political action at two governmental levels. This new federal practice is a political expedient and unlike old style federalism, which presupposes mainly competitive relationship between two levels, it presupposes both conflict and consensus and a common interest in available resources as embedded in intergovernmental relationships. Nwoko (2014) averred that federalism presents a more suitable form of civil administration in a large population and landmass with considerable ethnic, religious, linguistic and climatic diversity.

Federalism is a compromise solution in a multinational state between two types of self-determination, that is, the determination provided by a national government which guarantees security for all in the nation–state on one hand, and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities on the other.

Federalism emerges from the aspiration of people to organize a federal relationship without, of necessity, relinquishing their identity (Friederich, 1968). Federalism, according to Ramphal (1979) provides attempt to satisfy the need for cooperation in some things coupled with the rights of separate actions in others. This is why Wheare (1964) submitted that federalism emphasizes non-centralization of power, where each component unit of the federal system has its powers and functions delineated and guaranteed in a constitutional document thereby making federalism the method of dividing power so that the general and subnational government are each, within a sphere coordinate and independent.

In practice, no country has been able to embody the traditional definition of federal principle. In fact, the general consensus is that federal systems vary in content from one country to the other, taking on the colouration of the historical experiment, the political, cultural, social and economic ecology of each society and the disposition of its people at any particular point in time. Ranjit Sarkaria in Arora (1991) drive home this point when he says:

the classical concept of federalism which envisaged two parallel governments of coordinate jurisdiction, operating in isolation from each other in watertight compartments, is nowhere a functional reality now... federalism had come to be understood as a dynamic process of cooperation and shared action between two or more levels of government, with increasing interdependence.

Elaigwu (2014) while appraising the politics of federalism in Nigeria's new democratic polity averred that in the terminal days of Nigeria's transition to civil rule, a number of issues had become evident in the political horizon of the country. He opined that given the many years of military rule, the Nigerian polity was like a bottle of wine, properly cooked and airtight. However, the opening of the bottle at the dawn of democracy left the wine explosively popped up leaving in its wake bubbles that are yet to settle down.

The Nigerian federation is confronted with myriads of challenges bothering on the issues of centralization and decentralization in the relations among the tiers of government. The military May 1999 when it handed over to the civilians was accused by many groups of bequeathing a federation that had become excessively centralized.

In the area of policing which forms the core of this paper, events moments after the handover date saw a situation where the Nigeria Police was increasingly been used by politician at the federal centre to force their whims and caprices down the throats of politicians at the subnational level against clear constitutional provision. Again relying on Elaigwu (2014) there were signs of residual militarism in the actions of political executive in that:

The ghost of military's politics of control has had difficulty leaving the scene..., federal officials treated state and local officials with overbearing arrogance. In federal–state interaction, the relations between [the] president and state Governors oscillated between 'hot' and 'cold'. The state governors were not pleased with the [Federal] president's way of operating.... They accused him of taking actions in flagrant disregard of federally desirable and constitutional guaranteed autonomy of state governments.

The submission given above succinctly captures the mentality of the operators of the 1999 Constitution on matters of policing and the use which the federal politicians make the Nigerian Police to serve in the period under review.

The police as institution and instrument of order

The main essence of policing is to promote harmony and to secure life and property. It is also to defend the status-quo, that is, enforcing law, defending societal values, ideologies and the distribution of power and wealth in the community. Police inhibits people from propagating alternatives to the established norms and social order. At whatever stage of social development, police are empowered to coerce, and suppress, although the level at which these acts are perpetuated will differ both in time and space. This in turn depends on the level of political and economic development of the people, that is, the extent to which the concepts of democracy, justice and equity are imbibed and practiced. It is no wonder that Alemika (1993) concluded that:

Policing therefore involve coercive and, or ideological regimentation of social life, through the activities of police and sundry state intelligence and security forces.... Aimed at suppressing behaviour, actions and orientation that threaten the prevailing social order.

It is pertinent that to police effectively, people and organization need to be abreast of relevant laws, the rule of law and social arrangement, else, the ruling class may turn it into an instrument of state terrorism against critics, imagined or real enemy, and to suppress the already marginalized poor in the society. These are the reasons why police is being perceived differently by the people. This is why again Alemika (1993) says the police represent alternatively and simultaneously civil order, repression and help. They are greeted with fear, respect, warmth and hatred. These different perceptions of police also account for the differing definition of police.

Accordingly, Black quoted in Alemika (1993) defines the police as:

A legal official who handle complaints from citizens and who proceed against conduct that they themselves define as offensive. The police is that aspect of legal life, that touches most people and it is probably the most controversial.

In the same vein, Klocker & Mastrofski (1991) sees the police as, the institution or individuals given the general right to use coercive force by the state within the state's domestic territory.

Van Maanen and Barley (1984) refers to the police as the employees of the community, for the most part uniformed, whose special purpose is to ensure that the community's laws are applied.... possess [ing] an exclusive domestic mandate and they are usually the initial point of contact between citizen and enforcement machinery.

It is significant to appreciate that socio-economic and national development is normally a function of stable internal security, but stability in internal security, implies the ability of the police to protect the lives and properties of the people and economic investments. Police roles can be classified into law enforcement ones and those of ensuring peace and stability in the community e.g. helping accident victims surveillance, setting of feud and so on and so forth. Irrespective of the existing situation, there must exist a point of balance between the total freedom of the individual and the restriction of that freedom in the bid to preserve laws and order. The police need to fit into the framework of legal and social system of any country so that safeguards are provided in order to ensure that the police act within that balance. In a totalitarian country, police role is clear cut, and they operate with few inhibitions, but in a democratic setting, there is need for the police to be constrained in order to maintain the needed democratic balance.

The basic attributes of the police include wide visibility as their activities are difficult to disguise and are in contact with everyone most of the time. Also, police possess a near monopoly of the instrument of force, domestically, which create around them the aura of apprehension, of anxiety, of fear etc. In another breadth, the police have responsibility for safeguarding the most basic elements of human life and conclusively, they are immediately identified with law.

An overview of police formations in Britain, United States of America and France

Today in the western world, police is embracing the delivery of social services in times of distress and emergencies which promotes cordial relation and cooperation with the general public. The character of a society, to a large extent, influences the organization, function and performance of the police. There is no gainsaying that urbanization, political and economic crisis, level of community's perceived sense of insecurity, violence and vandalism constitute the forces that influence police behaviour in any society (Zheng, 2015). The conduct and nature of police activities in any society will be a pointer to the character of the political regime in that society. No government will be seen to be democratic, if the police restrict public meetings, political demonstration or intimidate the people by use of force. In any form of society, the police can play a formative role in shaping the environment where they exist both politically and socially. (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984).

In Britain, police are locally administrated but subject to strong central government influence. According to Bunyard (1978) there are 43 separate police forces in England and Wales, 8 in Scotland and 1 in Northern Ireland, but each with a local police authority, a Chief Constable (independent of the crown), and responsible to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The police authority is responsible for the maintenance of a police force, a Chief Constable responsible for its direction and control whilst the Secretary of State ensures that it is efficient. In addition, the Secretary of State also ensures that there exist a substantial degree of uniformity of practice and condition of service throughout Britain. He sees to it that resources that an individual force cannot maintain are provided on a national basis as central service. It is worthy of note that half the cost of police funding is borne by central government. While he can hire and fire a Chief Constable, its deputy and assistant, the Secretary of State has no operational control over them. As for the Chief Constable, in

addition to the provision of the Police Act, the court have emphasized that the office is independent of the executive and he is answerable to the law and the law alone. He is further accountable for his own action and that of his men, to his police authority, central government and the public.

Again Bunyard (1978) states that the United States of America (USA) Police Service is divided into about 40,000 separate agencies with no national governmental control, support or inspection, and often with more than one agency having jurisdiction in on place. Normal police functions are carried out by a mixture of police forces based on states, counties, townships and villages formations. The appointments of head of police departments are dependent on local government elections. In the U.S., police officers can be Marshals, Sheriffs or Constable, and in any one town it is possible to find the State Police, the county Sheriff's office, the City Police Department and even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and all of them with some form of jurisdiction. He concluded that, the absence of central government involvement in U.S. local affairs results in powerful local government, with control as there is, tends to be administered by courts and the press, rather than the national government.

In France, the country is divided into departments and each headed by prefect, who owes his appointment to the central government, but is responsible for law and order. Two national organizations carry out policing duties in the country – the Police Nationale, with authority over the entire country, but restricted to towns with up to 10,000 people, and the Gendarmerie who police rural areas and town of less than 10,000 inhabitants. The Police Natioinale and Gendarmerie co-existence is due to historical accident, but effort to unify them has been abortive, because the dual system prevents the whole county's formation from coming under one operational command. This is the reason why Bunyard (1978) argues that this provides a safeguard against being used unconstitutionally. However, since the members of the two formations are clearly instruments of one government, it seems that the safeguard is purely notional.

The Nigeria Police: A historical perspective

What transformed into the Nigeria Police was first established in 1820. In 1879 a 1,200-member armed paramilitary Hausa Constabulary was formed. In 1896 the Lagos Police was established. A similar force, the Niger Coast Constabulary, was formed in Calabar in 1894 under the newly proclaimed Niger Coast Protectorate. In the North, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary became the Northern Nigeria Police, and part of the Niger Coast Constabulary became the Southern Nigeria Police. During the colonial period, most police were associated with local governments (Native Authorities). However, in the 1960s, under the First Republic, these forces were first regionalized and then nationalized. The Nigeria Police (NP) is designated by Section 194 of the 1979 Constitution as the national police of Nigeria with exclusive jurisdiction throughout the country (retrieved from http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria_Police_Force).

The Nigerian experience showed that the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions allowed for the existence of Native Authority (NA) Police system side by side with the national one. With military incursion into politics and in 1966 there has existed only a single police organization formation for the entire country, empowered by subsequent constitutional provisions. The command of the police is vested in the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and the police contingent stationed in each state comes under the command of the Commissioner of Police (CP), subject to the authority of IGP. The aim of such arrangement is to protect the force

from abuse and undue political influence. However, this position has continued to receive knocks from Nigerians giving rise to call for the establishment of State Police to cater for peculiarities of States side by side the national one.

The 1999 Constitution established the office of IGP in Section 212(1) and vested it with the command of the entire force. However, given that the Nigeria Police is only the main instrument of law and order in the entire federation, the constitution provided a machinery for consultation with State Government through the provision of the existence of body known as the Police Council. But as Nwabueze (1983) has observed, the control of the police is unduly centralized in the Federal Government... [as] the system of single police itself is irreconcilable with federalism, thereby exposing the system to political manipulation by the party in control of the centre, making the temptation too great to be restricted if and when furthering one's political ambition is at stake.

Though, the Nigeria Police find its constitutional existence based on the provision of Section 153 of the 1999 constitution as spelt out in the Third Schedule, Section 27 – 30 that, there shall be one police formation, for the entire country under the control and management of the Police Council with the following members: the President who shall be the chairman; the Governor of each state of the federation; the Chairman of the Police Service Commission and the IGP. The functions of the council include the organization and administration of the NP.

The fact that Section 215(4) empowers the Governors to give lawful directive to the State CP which the CP should comply with or cause them to be complied with, has not in any way enhanced the authority of the Governor, because the CP can request the matter to be referred to the President or the Minister of Police Affairs/Interior irrespective of the urgency. In any case, the CP has the legal issue of lawfulness to play around with, if there is sinister motive. It may not be preposterous or stretching the imagination too far, but rather, stating the obvious that a CP or Assistant Inspector General of Police (AIG) of a zone can intentionally refuse to carry out the instruction from the Governor because he is not answerable to him as Section 214(1) without equivocation makes the management and control of the role existing police organization in Nigeria an exclusive preserve of the federal government, hence, the inclusion of the police and other security services establishment law in the Executive Legislative List as could be seen in item 45, Part I to the Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The Call for State Police

Though Abdulazeez (2002) argues that the existence of a single police force is not of necessity incompatible with federalism especially where the issue of control is constitutional resolved among the tiers of government the police is to service, Ubani (2005), nevertheless, postulates that, it is a pertinent principle of federalism that the division of power between the central and regional (sub-national) governments are so differentiated as to preserve the independence of both tiers of government in the performance of their respective duties, and this why Falana (2015) submitted that, the issue of establishing state police... is necessary in a federation. Obakhedo (2015) furthered this argument by stating that the existence of a single national police outfit is at variance with federal system of government.

In the specific case under review, the function of maintaining law and order and securing lives and property within a state cannot but be viewed as part of the duty of the State Government. The 1999 Constitution for instance, in an acknowledgment of this fact in Section 11(2) empowers State House of Assembly to make laws with respect to the

maintenance and securing of public safety and public order in their States. And it is in line with this that Section 215(4) of the Constitution states that:

Subject to the provision of this section the Governor of a state... may give the Commissioner of Police of that state such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, and the Commissioner of the Police shall comply....

The contradiction, though, is that while assigning the State Government a role in the maintenance of public safety and public order, the constitution proceeds to deny them independent capacity for discharging these functions, when, the same Section 214(4) carries a proviso which stipulates that before carrying out any such directive of the Governor.

...the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the President for these directions...

Advocates of State Police see such proviso as a clear usurpation of the State Government's powers. Many State Governor's since 1999 have had cause to question the workability of such provision in the constitution blaming the breakdown of law and order leading to conflicts that occurred in certain domains on the inability of the police to speedily address and arrest deteriorating conflict situation on time on the pretext that orders had to be sought from 'above' before action could be taken even when they i.e. the Governor could have easily coordinated with the State CPs to ensure that there were no breakdown of law and order in their domains (Bulus, 2012).

Also, it is quite easy to see how the federal government can abuse its monopolistic control of the Nigeria Police to impose its political preferences upon States. Memories are fresh of how the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)-controlled Federal Government capitalized on certain provision of the 1979 Constitution on police to destabilize states controlled by rival parties during the Second Republic. The Nigeria Police was deployed as part of the instruments used to massively rig the 1983 gubernatorial and presidential elections across the country in favour of NPN (Dauda, 2011).

More intriguing was the scenario in 2003 when certain individual due to an obvious central government backing made use of the instrumentality of the Nigeria Police to arrest and forced a serving Governor to illegally resign his position despite constitutional provision insulating serving Governors from arrest. Not only was the Police Officer, AIG Ralph Ige who led the adoption of the Governor was merely retired with full benefits, the CP of the State also for a long while declined the reinstatement of the police security details attached to the Governor (Dr. Chris Ngige) despite an order by a competent court reinstating the Governor as the Governor of Anambra State (Ojeife, 2003; Shekarau, Mohammed & Musa-Kperogi, 2003).

Similarly, in six other instances where State Governors were impeached, the Nigeria Police was copiously deployed to assist renegade and disgruntled lawmakers driven mainly by sympathy for some godfathers who had Federal Government backing to unlawfully

impeach State Governors who were viewed by the welders of federal power as been ‘enemies’ without recourse to constitutional provisions on the proper use of the police and adherence to procedure and process of impeachment (Kumolu, 2014). (The Governors so impeached are as presented below:

S/N	NAME	STATE	DATE	REASON(S)
i	Diepreye Alamieseigha	Bayelsa	9/12/2005	Alleged (but later convicted for) theft public fund, abuse of office and money laundering. (Later pardoned)
Ii	Rashidi Ladoja	Oyo	12/01/2006	Alleged refusal to share security vote with godfathers (Restricted)
Iv	Ayo Fayose	Ekiti	16/10/2006	Alleged mismanagement of public fund and serial killing (Re-elected Governor in 2014) (impeachment declared unconstitutional by court)
iii	Peter Obi	Anambra	2/11/2006	Misconduct (Restricted)
Iv	Joshua Dariye	Plateau	13/11/2006	Alleged siphoning of public fund and money laundering in London. (Reinstated)
V	Muritala Nyako	Adamawa	July, 2014	Alleged theft of public fund, abuse of office, and money laundering

Source: www.toning/news/13876

Therefore, the argument has been that the Nigeria Police was easily deployed to carry out this brazen act of illegality because the officers and men are not in any way answerable to the State Governor.

Ochei (2016) opines that against the backdrop of Nigeria’s current huge security challenges one veritable way out of the quagmire of insecurity and similar challenges would be the establishment of State Police. His submission is borne out of what he referred as the persistent allegations of abuse of the Nigeria Police (NP) by those who currently run and control it. He goes further to say that State Police formations would be more penetrable and widespread as well as more community friendly relative to the NP stressing that since State Governments now bore a reasonable percentage of the platforms and other logistics elements for securing their various states, it would only made sense for (the states) to be constitutionally allowed to establish, fund and operate state police.

Argument against State Police

The aversion for State Police cannot be divorced from the experiences Nigerian had with the Native Authority (NA) Police, which operated at the local government level in the Northern and Western Regions till April 1967. The involvement of NA Police in local policing was particularly effective in the maintenance of order and the control of conventional crimes. It was also cost effective as far as the standards then were. Despite its attractions, during the period it lasted, the NA/Local Government Police became a major instrument for harassing political opponents in the years before 1966, due mainly to intolerance of opposition by politician in power, thereby leading in part to the failure of Nigeria’s first experience in multiparty democracy (Rotimi, 1991).

According to Ubani (2002) these infamous NA Police structures were first used by the colonialists and then in the First Republic, from 1960 – 1966 by the Nigerian ruling elite to suppress and dehumanize political opponents and ethnic minorities. The memories of this notorious past invoke fear in the minds of Nigerians, making some politically conscious Nigerians to quickly point to these legacies in support of their argument against State Police. Thus, the call for State Police is criticized as being a design by power-hungry State Governors to create instruments of coercion with which to rule people with an iron fist (Kehinde, 2013).

Given this historical background, it is argued that even though State Police is compatible with the principle of federalism, the creation of specific institutions and mechanism of federalism must be instructed by the specific historical experiences of specific societies. Although, the examples of federalism as that of the United States of America (USA) enables the operation of the equivalent of State Police, this must be because the historical evolution America necessitated the existence of such institution. The Nigerian experience it is argued suggest clearly that the effort at the reestablishment of State Police should be exercised with caution.

Conclusion

Given all that has been discussed, the Nigeria Police earned itself a bad image when it comes to the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities. The level of personal insecurity and violation of human rights due to operational and political reasons speak volume of this image. Elaigwu (2014) on this matter submitted that:

The failure to perform up to expectation pushed some State Governments to establish vigilative groups.

He when further to say that the way the police is used/misused by the federal wielders of political power have prompted many to resoundingly suggest the establishment of State Police.

Fundamentally the defect of the current Nigeria policing arrangement is its colonial antecedent. The founding philosophy of most colonial states and their agencies (including the Police) was not about humane enforcement of democratically made laws or the security of lives and property. It was, first, about ensuring and enabling the economic plundering of the local people by foreign enterprises like Royal Niger Company (RNC) which itself was one of the progenitors of what is now known as Nigeria Police. The essence of policing in that era was about the cruel suppression of popular opposition to colonial rule like the Aba Women Riot, the Epe uprising and victimization of anti-colonial crusaders like Gambo Sawaba, Margaret Ekpo, Herbert Macaulay etc. And this is why Olukoshi (2003) reiterates that:

African... crisis was accompanied by increased levels of political repression and exclusion which further widened the gulf between state and society, popular social forces and the wielders of state power [which]... not only exacerbated the crisis of decline but also represented the final nail in the coffin of the post-colonial [State].

Recommendation

One major step that should be explored is how to redefine the *raison d'être* of the Nigeria Police as distinct from the concept of an army of occupation to that of popularly controlled agency for the mediation of social conflicts according to collectively determined rules. The reconceptualization should lead to constitutional reforms in favour of autonomous police formations for the subnational units of the Nigerian federation in the final analysis.

However, while this process is being undertaken, the Nigeria Police should be decentralized such that it can operate efficiently in each state. The Governor of the State should be delegated some powers by the President such that within certain limits, he can operate effectively in collaboration with the CP in the State, referring only very serious matters to the President and the IGP.

Similarly, the point also should be made that the politicians should change their attitude by not politicizing the use of the Nigeria Police for unconstitutional, self-serving engagements that can destroy the reputation of the police.

Finally, the leadership, officers and men of the Nigeria Police should embark on attitudinal rebirth by fortifying themselves with the ware withal [in term of training, retraining, enhance emolument, better working environment and accommodation) to resist any attempt by misdirected politicians to use/misuse them counter to the socio-political purpose for which they were established to serve.

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