
PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY; FOCUS ON THE LIBERIA CRISIS

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ABSTRACT – *Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country's foreign policy has been Afro-centric. The need to study Nigeria's peace keeping missions in relation to Nigeria's foreign policy was the main objective of this research. The focus is particularly on the Nigeria's role in the Liberian crisis. The study adopted the content analysis technique where-in Nigeria's participation in the restoration of peace in Liberia under the auspices of the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) was seen as very commendable and underlined Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy drive. Evidently, Nigeria's interest in global peace and, in fact, her physical involvement in peace operations especially the Liberia crisis falls into the middle range of foreign policy objectives. The study exposed the fact that Nigeria has committed to her foreign policy in other areas such as technical assistance, economic blocs, trade, transport, communication etc. Thus, Nigeria's leadership position as the giant of Africa was cemented with her efforts in economic integration, and notably peace keeping operations. It also did consolidate Nigeria's foreign policy which is Afro-centric. Nigeria indeed played the big brother's role, by leading and almost wholly financing the Liberian peace keeping operation. It was recommended that Nigerian leaders should conduct a comprehensive review of the country's foreign policy in line with her current economic realities and challenges.*

Key words: Afro-centric, Foreign policy, Liberia crisis, Nigeria, Peace keeping missions.

Background of the Study

Aftermath of the First World War saw the creation of the League of Nations in 1929. The major aim of the league was to advance international corporation and achieve international peace and security (Joint Warfare, 2001). According to (Sule, 2013), the League of Nations failed to maintain the purpose for which it was created and this made the World to descend into a Second World War. It was at this period that the United Nations was created at the end of the Second World War in 1945. Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country's interest and commitment to world peace has put her in the forefront of troop-contributing nations to support UN, regional, and sub-regional led Peace Support Operations (PSO).

Globally, Nigeria participated in conflict area such as Lebanon, the area of the former Yugoslavia and in Kuwait etc. (Sule, 2013). At the regional level, Nigeria has contributed to various peace building and peacekeeping efforts on the African continent such as Congo, Guinea Bissau etc. For example, at the sub regional level, Nigeria played a prominent role in the integration and peace building efforts within the west-African region in places such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Liberia. To date, Nigeria has contributed armed military contingents, unarmed military observers, military staff officers, formed police units and police advisors as well as civilian experts to more than 40 UN, OAU/AU and ECOWAS missions.

Part of Nigeria's foreign policy has been to contribute to the peaceful co-existence of countries in the African region. Nigeria's peace-keeping initiative took off concurrently as Nigeria got her independence in October 1960 and she started channeling her foreign policy towards Africa peace. The primary concern for Nigeria at the time was to play key roles in resolving intra and inter-state conflicts in Africa most especially in West Africa. Nigeria's participation in peace keeping missions in the Congo provided the test of Nigerian policy in Africa (Izah, 1991), although some scholars were of the view that Nigeria found itself in international politics with a rude shock as it was being called upon to decide on a main African issue when even the debate on its general foreign policy statement had not been concluded. Nevertheless, the Congo mission provided Nigeria with the opportunity to re-emphasize the fundamental principle of respect for the existing boundaries in Africa (Izah, 1991).

Nigeria intervened in the Liberian crisis under the umbrella of the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG). According to Nas (1996), there was an initial high resentment of what a majority of Liberians perceived as gross human rights abuses by the then Head of state, President Samuel Doe. The second development which gave rise to the Liberian crisis had to do with the rise of Mr. Charles Taylor in defense of what he perceived as gross human rights abuses (Nas, 1996). The third cause of the Liberian crisis had an external dimension which Bassey (1994) observed as having to do with the indifferences of the U.S.A. in spite of the historic relations between Liberia and the United States.

However, on the 27th November 1989, the stage was set for battle between three warring contingents in Liberia namely; President Samuel Doe, Yomi Johnson, and Charles Taylor. So by April — May 1990, the scope and intensity of massacres of mostly defenseless, helpless civilians touched greatly the settlement of some leaders in the ECOWAS countries (Olorunlomu, 2013). As rightly said that the sub-regional leaders reasoned that the worst would happen not only in Liberia but its neighbors if the lawless condition was not arrested. Instead of remaining at a distance to watch and sympathize with the Liberian people, the

West African sub-regional leadership thought it wise to undertake the responsibility of arresting the intractable crisis situation in Liberia (Okolie, 2010).

As a result, ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was sent to Liberia on 9th of August same year 1990. After the Banjul resolution was taken, military contingents of four ECOWAS countries Nigeria, Ghana, Republic of Guinea, and Sierra Leone arrived in Monrovia with their troops. The ECOMOG troops that landed in Monrovia were almost five thousand military men (Okolie, 2010). Within the first few weeks of landing in Monrovia, ECOMOG successfully set Up an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer. Within a few weeks of arrival, ECOMOG was able to push Charles Taylors force to the out skirts of Monrovia and created a buffer between two warring factions Prince Johnson's group and Samuel Doe's group within central Monrovia (Sule, 2001). On September 9th, 1996, president Doe was shot and his bodyguards were slaughtered, and this marked the beginning of restoration of peace in Liberia (Aja, 1998).

Nigeria also applied diplomatic approach in finding a lasting solution to the Liberian crisis. Having successfully moved in peacekeeping troops in Liberia, Nigeria, under ECOWAS, appealed to Western countries and global bodies. However, despite the controversies and many difficulties faced by the participating countries in peace keeping mission to Liberia, Nigeria under the umbrella of ECOMOG made a remarkable contribution and the participating nations were able to restore peace in Liberia in January 1997. This came at a time when Nigeria was pursuing an all-embracing foreign policy which had at the time become a focus point for Nigeria's foreign relations.

It therefore, becomes imperative at this point to study the impact or the role Nigeria played in the resolution of the conflict that ensued in Liberia from November 1989 and go further to examine Nigeria's foreign policy with regards to her roles in peace keeping operations with the Liberian crisis in focus. Also, this study tries to examine Nigeria and Africa's peace initiatives and leadership role in Africa as well as other roles apart from wars, crisis & peace initiatives in Africa.

Literature Review

The major theoretical foundation of this study is the liberal peace theory. Boulding (1978) held that both the theory and practice of peace operations are informed by an often unspoken commitment to the liberal peace (Paris, 1997; 2002; 2004). At the interstate level, liberal peace is based on the observation that democratic states do not wage war on other states they regard as being democratic. It does not mean that democracies do not wage war at all or that they are less warlike in their relations with non- democracies; it only that democracies tend not to fight each other. In addition, liberal democracies are said to be the least likely states to descend into civil war or anarchy.

Exponents of this theory generally agree that through the legislatures and judiciaries, democratic systems impose powerful institutional constraints on decision-makers, inhibiting their opportunities for waging war rashly. These inhibitions are further strengthened by the plethora of regional institutions (such as the ECOWAS) to which liberal democratic states are tied. Also, proponents of this theory posit that liberal peace is normative and holds that democratic states do not fight each other because they recognize one another's inherent legitimacy (Osimen et al, 2015) and have shared interests in the protection of international trade which are ill-served by war.

Within states, the legitimacy associated with democracy makes it very difficult to mobilize arms against the prevailing order, reducing the likelihood of civil wars. In arguing that peace operations are informed by liberal peace theory, we mean that peace operations have tried to create stable peace by promoting and defending the principles that underpin liberal peace. To this end, one of Nigeria's foreign policies clearly aligns with the liberal peace principle and it is on this premise that the country engaged in peace keeping operations to cement its pride of place amongst African states.

Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Africa's Peace Initiatives (1960-1999)

Akinboye and Otor (2007) noted that foreign policy can be seen as a type of policy that transcends the boundary of a given state. It is that type of action a state embarks upon in its interaction with other member-states in the international environment, in the process of striving to attain its objectives and goals. When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, successive Nigerian Government made Africa the centerpiece of the nation's foreign policy. Nigeria's primary concern is to play key roles in resolving intra and interstate conflicts in Africa and avoid any extra Africa involvement in purely African issues. Nigeria had made several attempts to project its power beyond its National boundaries. Nigeria played leading roles in peace initiatives and efforts in respect of the Angolan conflict, the Ugandan internal turmoil under Idi Amin, the Somalia-Ethiopian conflict, the Liberian-Chadian conflict, the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, the resolution of crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone, etc.

However, foreign policy is described as the course of action of a state in relation with other states. The main objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy as cited in (Yakubu, 2011) have been identified as;

- a. the defense and promotion of Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence;
- b. the creation of the necessary economic and political conditions to secure the government territorial and national independence of other Africa countries and their total liberation from imperialism and all forms of foreign domination;
- c. creation of the necessary conditions for economic, political, social and cultural development of Africa;
- d. promotion of the rights of all blacks and oppressed peoples throughout the world;
- e. promotion of Africa unity;
- f. promotion of world peace built on freedom;
- g. mutual respect and equality for all peoples of the world;
- h. respect for the territorial integrity of all nations, non-partnership in east-west ideologies disputes and
- i. freedom of association and action in the international system

These objectives have retained their vitality and remained virtually unedited through the changes of regimes and the vagaries of domestic policies. Not even the Adeji Foreign Policy Review Panel could assemble a more comprehensive or radically different set of objectives, neither could the medio-dramatic declaration of Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy in the 1970s be considered a fundamental departure from pre-existing commitments, attitudes or orientation. Under Tafawa Balewa, Aguiyi Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon (i.e. from 1960 through early 1970s), Africa was always given pride of place in the declaration. Therefore, there was neither a shift of substance nor even of emphasis. It was

more of a declaration of a new combative attitude towards African affairs and a warning to external powers that Nigeria would confront their meddling in Africa at every turn.

However, as the search for African unity intensified, Nigeria's policy towards the liberation movements in Africa was undergoing some changes. Some of those changes became manifest after the organization of Africa unity (OAU) was founded (now African Union). Having played significant role in the effort that led to the establishment of the continental body which not only made the liberation of the entire continent its priority but also set a special liberation fund to be administered by the specially created liberation committee, Nigeria began to implement these changes so that the new organization might be able to achieve its objective. Among those changes was the decision of the Balewa Government to pay Nigeria's contributions to the liberation fund promptly (Aja, 1998). In fact, Aja (1998) noted that within a year after the establishment of the PAU liberation committee of which Nigeria was a member, she became "the biggest contributor to the funds" of the committee. With emphasis on Nigeria's foreign policy objective which stipulates: promotion of the rights of all black's and oppressed people throughout the world, it was in view of this that Nigeria intervened in the Liberian crisis of 1990s.

Nigeria's Participation in Restoring Peace to Liberia

The crisis in Liberia, as earlier stated, was a direct result of high public resentment of what a majority of Liberians perceived as gross human rights abuses by the then Head of state, president Samuel Doe. Secondly, there was a power tussle between the president Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor and Mr. Yomie Johnson. The quest and struggle for power and control among the three forced to mass suffering of the innocent citizens of Liberia whom each group sought to protect. Death tolls increased, properties got destroyed. Unprecedented numbers of refugees were reproduced on a daily basis. Chaos, gunshots, and general disorder took over the melodious songs of brides in the once peaceful Liberia (Bassey, 1994). The situations in Liberia were so terrible that even the United States and other national government felt that their diplomatic mission were better withdrawn for safety and security (Gasba, 1994).

Nigeria's primary concern at the period was to play key role in resolving intra and inter-state conflicts in Africa on the basis of Africa initiatives and avoid any extra-African involvement. However at the 13th summit of the Head of state and government of ECOWAS, Nigeria proposed the intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis to halt mass killings of Liberians and make the West African sub region, safer from extra regional interference (Gasba, 1994). The proposal was accepted and the pattern of intervention was to be through a mediation committee that should help bring the belligerent parties to embrace negotiation to restore order and peace in Liberia. This gave credence to the creation of ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG). In an attempt to do away with incidental form of misperception of Nigeria initiative, Gen. Babangida explained thus that

"...our position was different, while Nigeria respect the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a member state, the country believed very strongly that the crisis in Liberia, the oldest independence state in West Africa, demanded the attention of ECOWAS..."(Adebayo, 1989).

Nigeria extended its foreign policy objectives in Liberia by contributing to the military equipment from the onset, Nigeria came out quite well militarily to help ECOMOG take off

on a good note. Nigeria provided naval ships, trucks, tankers, armored cars, land rovers, and trailer loads of ammunition. On ground forces, Nigeria contributed not only the highest number of troops but ensured successive batches of military force to meet contingences (Bassey, 1994).

Another crucial area of Nigeria's prime contribution was finance. (Aja, 1998) noted that without a considerable financial base, ECOMOG would have found it difficult to operate with remarkable efficiency. Just like Nigeria in the formation of ECOWAS, the country provided about two-third of the finance for the initial 6500 ECOMOG soldiers who were to receive \$25 per soldier as allowance in 1991; Nigeria had a budget of between \$250m and \$500m to assist the Liberian operations. On the financial involvement of Nigeria Gen. Babangida noted:

“Nigeria has Nigeria no apology to make. We are proud that Nigeria agreed to commit so much to her scarce resources towards the return of peace and order to Liberia. Nowhere is this Development more observed than in Liberia where complete Breakdown of law and order got almost unnoticed by the international community”. (Aja, 1998)

Nigeria's foreign affairs minister in 1996, Toml kimi made public that Nigeria had committed about N225bn to the efforts to bring order and peace in Liberia. Without the unflagging financial commitment of Nigeria, it would have been too difficult for the other concerned but weak ECOMOG member state to sustain the ECOMOG presence in Liberia (Aja, 1998).

Nigeria achieved its foreign policy peace initiative in Liberia, by restoring peace and order. Just as Nwachukwu (1999) rightly stated, “in point of history, Nigeria will always be remembered for its role in Liberia which eventually resulted in the return of democracy in Liberia in July, 1997”.

Nigeria's Involvement in Liberia and Formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

Nigeria's involvement in the resolution of Liberia civil war could be seen in the pioneering formation of the ECOWASS monitoring group (ECOMOG). At the 13th summit meeting of the heads of state, present at the meeting were foreign ministers of Togo and Mali, Nigeria proposed in the Liberian crisis to halt mass killings of Liberians and aliens residents and make the West African sub-region safer from extra — regional interference. The proposal was to be through a meditative committee that should help the belligerent parties to embrace negotiation to restore order and peace in Liberia. The eventual establishment of ECOMOG was not by imposition but persuasion on the part of Nigeria. After the Banjul meeting, ECOWAS countries had made their resolution on August 7, 1990. They went back to their various countries and instructed their various military commands to prepare contingents for Liberia (Ojo, 1999).

The arrival of ECOMOG troops in Monrovia was welcomed with widespread jubilation by the civilian population. Many highly traumatized civilians, who were weakened by starvation, could only carry themselves to an ECOMOG location for whatever survival help was available. In this way, ECOMOG took up a wide range of humanitarian roles (Nwangborogwu, 2015). ECOMOG gave out a great part of troops. Food to feed the civilian population and disguised fighter, central feeding centers were organized; corpses that littered

the streets of Monrovia were removed, the sick and the wounded were treated by the ECOMOG medical group. ECOMOG was the only existing symbol of order, ECOMOG navy evacuated, fleeing Liberian refugees to neighboring West-African countries (Nwangborogwu, 2015). At this stage there was no functioning non-governmental organization (NGO'S) in Monrovia the complete state of anarchy did not allow any humanitarian organization to operate. Although the world body designated Cote d'ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone as refugees' centers, Nigeria was known to have voluntarily made herself a centre (Ojo, 1999).

The initial duration of ECOMOG was a mandate of eighteen months. But then the turn of events in Liberia went beyond precision. In later years, after the crisis had dragged on for years longer than expected, the limits to which force could be taken became far more elastic; however Nigeria adopted a diplomatic approach in ending the war. This she did by extending their appeal to weak countries and global bodies, firm calls were often made to the United Nations and western powers to support the ECOWAS place initiatives. Representatives of O.A.U, UN and other western international organizations were often invited as observers to discussions on the Liberia crisis. Initially, the United Nations and Western powers, through officially expressing support for the ECOWAS initiative, generally showed a lukewarm attitude towards offering needed support, probably as a result of deep-seated skepticism as to the chances of success of ECOWAS approach. Gradually, United Nations practical support and assistance from western powers mainly USA, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands increased in terms of non-lethal support such as vehicles and communication equipment, petroleum products spare parts, internal security, night vision device, arms detectors, field engineering equipment, uniform accessories and tents (Olorunlomeru, 2013). Complete developments compelled ECOMOG to stay on till 1997.

Major Challenges

Some of the major challenges encountered by the ECOWAS monitoring group in the Liberian crisis can be outlined as follows:

- a) Most of the time, ECOMOG was tied down to conventional tactics, though with necessary adjustments, to the unconventional setting. Often, tactical objectives were in form of advances to clear a major highway and secure town from rebel control and establish it as a safe haven.
- b) Another impediment to the ECOMOG earlier attainment of peace was that ECOMOG lacks maps and topographical detail in Liberia operation, there was serious problems of unavailability of up to date operational maps. Available maps were outdated and could not serve military operation. Photocopies of a few available, fairly up to dated maps which ECOMOG got, courtesy of united states information service (USIS) were useful for higher operational planning, but deficient on infield tactical details (Onoja, 1999)
- c) Another problem that delayed the immediate cease fire in Liberia was that ECOMOG were short of intelligence collection. This was because much of the intelligence collection at the disposal of ECOMOG came from the civilian population of Liberia (Ajala, 1998).
- d) The rebel factions, particularly the main and original insurgent group NPFL, had a pattern of using young ladies as spies (Onoja, 1999).

- e) Another obstacle to the immediate eradication of the civil war was that on the part of Nigeria, the country had no capacity to prosecute or end the war, or resource to provide necessary logistics. Tom-Ikomi (1992) noted that unfortunately, ECOMOG had not got the strength in terms of materials, logistic, to place the entire Liberia.

Current Nigeria's Foreign Policy; Lessons from the Peace Keeping Missions

Nigeria's foreign policy objectives are classified into three namely- the short range or core objectives; the middle range objectives and the long range objectives. The short range or core objectives are those values and interests that are critical for the survival of the country. Core objectives, usually are concerned with self-preservation and national integrity is considered the most critical objectives and may not necessarily be restricted to only Nigeria in question (Mbah, 2007). The middle range objectives of Nigeria in her foreign policy formulation and implementation are those that are not all that significant, though, significant enough to be pursued by the country. They include military assistance, foreign aid, foreign trade, defence of other states, support to other states to withstand destabilisation among others. Usually not as urgent as the core objectives, Nigeria can negotiate, bargain and make a trade off with other actors in the system if her middle range objectives are involved (Mbah 2007). Clearly, Nigeria's interest in global peace and, in fact, her physical involvement in peace operations especially the Liberia crisis falls into this range of foreign policy objectives. Additionally, Nigeria's long range foreign policy objectives are those objectives that have a messianic character to change the world community, for example world government and African Unity. Such objectives do not have fixed dates for their accomplishment. Nigeria, for instance, has the following as its long range foreign policy objectives; disarmament, arms control, creation of a new international economic order, attainment of global climatic/environmental security and achievement of world peace (Mbah 2007). These are policies that are certainly beyond the immediate or mid-range capabilities of Nigeria to determine.

Nigeria has displayed her Afro-centric nature in her foreign policies objectives. Nigeria has played vital role in achieving the country's foreign policies objectives as could be seen in the economic upliftment roles she has displayed in the African region. For instance, in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Development Bank (ADB), New partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the UNs Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), etc. Nigeria committed her scarce resources in seeing that these organizations were established.

In the area of technical assistance, Nigeria displayed its leadership role and has always given scholarship to needy African countries like Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. Nigeria has also provided funds for development projects as a member of the African Development Bank with funds provided by Nigeria and from which African countries can draw for financing their development programmes. Technical Aid Crops (TAC) scheme which began in 1987 and under which qualified Nigeria volunteers in various fields, IT Engineering, Business, Medicine, Nursing, Law, Architecture are sent every year to African and Caribbean countries which suffer man power shortage in these fields at little cost to the recipient. Nigeria has continued to insist that successful economic integration of the African continent can only come through sub regional and regional groupings based on co-operation between member states in such specific areas; as trade, transport, communication, and natural resources development.

The impact of Nigeria's presence did not end in the economic affairs of African state but rather, it was extended to the liberation of African states that were engulfed in one form of

crises of another. Nigeria has maintained its foreign policy objectives in the area of African integration and support for African unity. This is evident in the significant role that Nigeria played in integrating Africa states. To give practicable demonstration to Nigeria's foreign policy drive, the Federal Government of Nigeria created office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of African Integration and Economic Co-operation. The simple reason is that African is the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Nigeria has over the years contributed thousands of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, making her one of the largest contributors to global peace and security. At least five of these peace keeping missions have been commanded by senior Nigerian military officers. This comes after the success recorded in the Liberian crises by the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) which was comprised mostly of Nigerian troops. Even though many countries are contributors to UN peacekeeping forces, the greatest burden continues to be borne by a core group of developing countries including Nigeria. It is also worth noting that Nigeria has a bilateral agreement with UN as one of the countries which subscribe to the UN standby arrangements.

Recently, Nigeria has been facing internal security challenges. But this has not deterred the country from its key Afro-centric foreign policies. Nigeria has partnered with the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel to respond to the internal and external threats of Boko Haram as well as strengthen African economies. Oghenekevwe (2021) noted that an agreement on defense and security partnership between Nigeria and the United Kingdom was signed in 2018 as a way of tackling corruption and curbing terrorism in the African region. Nigeria is also a vital member of the Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) coalition. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) formed in 2015 to coordinate military operations between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger to fight Boko Haram and other armed groups was an off-shoot of Nigeria's continued Afro-centric foreign policy objectives (Oghenekevwe, 2021). Africa now see Nigeria as a major player in the maintenance of peace and peaceful co-existence in the African region and West African sub-region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, therefore, ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is perhaps a blessing in disguise to Nigeria. It helped to brighten her battered image abroad; it did proved further, Nigeria's leadership position as the giant of Africa. It also did consolidate Nigeria's foreign policy which is Afro-centric. Nigeria indeed played the big brother's role, by leading and almost wholly financing the peace keeping operation. What can be said to be greatest achievement made by the ECOMOG is that it finally achieved peace in Liberia with the election in July 1999 which ushered in Charles Taylor as the first post war civilian president of Liberia. ECOMOG has proved that it can move into crisis region in the sub-region to maintain peace.

The successes recorded by the Nigerian mission in Liberia under the auspices of the ECOWAS have enabled Nigeria to be the leader in the African continent on issues relating to security and terrorism threats. Nigeria's foreign policy objectives have not changed over the years and the country has demonstrated its will, ability and commitment to maintaining peace across West Africa. The country has also demonstrated its resolve for the promotion of economic, political and diplomatic cohesion in West Africa by helping to secure the sub-region as well as rid it of protracted civil wars through her commitment of oil resources, political and diplomatic tactics. Therefore, it becomes pertinent at this point to note that Africa is gradually moving on from the past woes of civil wars, as a result, Nigerian leaders should conduct a comprehensive review of the country's foreign policy in line with her

current economic realities and challenges. The following key recommendations are put forward:

1. The era of pursuing ornamental foreign policy goals is over. Nigerian government should face the reality of a teeming population of poor, hungry, angry and frustrated people, who are seemingly neglected. This is not advocating for a policy of indifference to the problems of Nigeria's immediate neighbours, rather Nigeria's level of involvement in foreign issues concerning security must be made to reflect our present realities and challenges.
2. Nigeria should desist from any form of unilateral peacekeeping activity and seek at all times, the collective burden-sharing and UN approved and sponsored approach to peace support operations.
3. Nigeria is not immune to the security threats faced by most countries in Africa today. Thus, the country must face its own security challenges headlong and minimize the level of Afro-centric foreign policies. Often times, Nigeria has ignorantly mobilized to pitch tent in wars that often decimate her military forces while benefiting powerful western nations with vested interests in such conflict territories.

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