

AFRICAN UNION – REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES RELATIONS IN THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: A SYNERGY OR COMPETITION?

Ogunnoiki, Adeleke Olumide

Graduate Student, Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos State, Nigeria

+234 803 528 63 53

adeleke_ogunnoiki@yahoo.com

Abstract

For over five decades, Africa has been a theatre of bloody civil wars, conflicts, crises, coup d'états, post-election violence and terrorism that have not only claimed the lives of millions of unarmed civilians, but also disrupted the peace and stability of the continent. Hence, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), despite being sub-regional economic organisations, have since the early 1990s taken up the responsibility of primarily preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in their sub-region. Based on this indispensable role RECs have played over the years in the peace and security of the continent, the African Union (AU) has recognised eight of them and made them the 'building blocks' of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This paper therefore examines the hierarchical relationship between the AU as the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the eight RECs. The objective of the study is to proffer an answer to the research question, is there, based on the principle of 'subsidiarity', a synergy or competition between the AU and RECs?. The answer surfaced following the study of the AU-ECOWAS relations on the Malian crisis in 2012. The historical approach was adopted for this study and the qualitative method of secondary data collection.

Keywords: African Union, Regional Economic Communities, African Peace and Security Architecture, Principle of Subsidiarity

Introduction

Since the postcolonial era began in Africa, several African countries have experienced intermittent military coup d'états and counter-coups; civil wars, ethno-religious/resource-based conflicts, post-election violence, and more recently, terrorist attacks that have disrupted the peace and stability of Africa's sub-regions. To have borne most of the responsibility of preventing, managing and resolving the aforementioned security challenges are Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU).

As far back as the 1990s, RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and, the Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have played a major role in the management and resolution of wars and conflicts in Member States – ECOWAS military intervention in Liberia (1990-1998 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998-1999) and, Cote D'Ivoire (2003-2004), SADC military intervention in Lesotho (1998) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1998), IGAD mediation role between the government of Sudan and the People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 2005 and, ECCAS military intervention in Central African Republic (CAR) in 2008 (Franke, 2007; Fanta, 2009; Grasa and Mateos, 2010; Ancas, 2011; Van Hoeymissen, 2011; Elowson and Albuquerque, 2016).

The regional body – the AU, since it was founded in 2002, has also been a major player in the preservation of Africa's peace and stability through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Occasionally, the AU with the support of RECs has spearheaded peacekeeping missions in war-torn and conflict-ridden African countries as well as observer missions in countries conducting elections – the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003; the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 (later became the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on December 31st, 2007), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the AU Military Observer Mission in Comoros (MIOC)/AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) in 2004 and 2008 respectively and, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) (formerly MICOPAX) in 2013 (Franke, 2007; Grasa and Mateos, 2010; Adetula, 2015; Ogunnoiki, 2018a). In the fight against terrorism, the AU endorsed in 2015 the *ad hoc* Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) of 7,500 troops from Nigeria, Niger, Benin the Cameroon and Chad to combat the Islamic terrorist organisation, Boko Haram.

This research paper therefore examines, based on the principle of subsidiarity, the existing hierarchical relationship between the AU and RECs within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The objective of the study is to answer the research question, is there a synergy or competition between the AU and RECs on Africa's peace and security?

1. Conceptual Framework

There are three salient concepts upon which this paper was developed. These three concepts are none other than: ‘African Peace and Security Architecture’, ‘Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)’ and, the ‘Principle of Subsidiarity’.

i) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the structure and institutions put in place to prevent, manage and resolve the wars and conflicts in Africa as well as to respond appropriately in a coordinated manner to other peace and security challenges on the continent (Brett, 2013). Legally, the APSA is predicated on two instruments – the Peace and Security Council Protocol (2002) and, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) (2004).

There are five pillars supporting the APSA – i) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – launched in May, 2004, it is the 15-member decision-making organ of the AU on peace and security matters; ii) the Panel of the Wise (PoW) – inaugurated in December, 2007, the Panel is made up of five eminent personalities who are selected based on regional representation for a period of three years. The Panel advises the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) on all issues pertaining to peace and security in Africa; iii) the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) – is the ‘situation room’ i.e. the observation and monitoring centre for potential conflict situations. The CEWS does this by collecting and analysing data for conflict prevention purposes; vi) the African Standby Force (ASF) – established in 2003, the ASF, though not fully operational, is made of five regional brigades with troops drawn from the REC in North, West, East, Central and Southern Africa. The ASF functions includes observer/monitoring/peacekeeping missions in Africa and lastly; v) the Peace Fund – the special fund for financing missions and operations vis-à-vis peace and security in Africa (African Union, 2002; Graser and Mateos, 2010; Brett, 2013; Adetula, 2015; Berhe and Waal, 2015; Kokolo, 2015).

Worth mentioning at this juncture is the hierarchical relationship/division of labour between the AU and RECs in the nascent APSA. Below the pyramid are the RECs which are primarily responsible for safeguarding the peace and stability of their sub-region while at the peak of the said pyramid is the AU that coordinates and harmonises the RECs peace and security activities.

ii) Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent of Africa are the sub-regional economic organisations with the primary aim of fostering the economic integration of Member States. Besides having this as a primary goal, RECs, owing to the nature of conflicts and wars in their sub-region, have included conflict prevention, management and resolution as part of their functions (Franke, 2007). Hence, the African Union (AU) has recognised eight RECs and made them the ‘building blocks’ of the APSA. The eight officially recognised

RECs are – i) Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) established in 1998; ii) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) formed in 1994; iii) East African Community (EAC) founded in 2000; iv) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) created in 1983; v) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established in 1975; vi) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) founded in 1996; vii) Southern African Development Community (SADC) formed in 1992; viii) Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU) created in 1989 (African Union Commission, 2015; Staden, 2016). Regional Mechanisms (RMs) on the other hand are security mechanisms in Africa. There are presently two RMs on the continent – Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) and, the North African Regional Capability (NARC).

iii) Principle of Subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity is one out of the three principles (subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage) that guide the AU-RECs relations on peace and security operations on the continent. The principle of subsidiarity is a principle on the allocation and exercise of political and legal authority in multilevel governance arrangements in which at least some competences are shared between different levels of politico–legal decision making (Staden, 2016). In other words, it regulates how to allocate or use authority within a political or legal order, typically in those orders that disperse authority between a centre and various member units (Follesdal, 1998 cited in Follesdal, 2011:6).

Historically, subsidiarity has been applied to the relations between central and local authorities. But as at now, it is fast becoming a principle in international politics that governs the relations between international organisations that have overlapping membership (ECCAS-CMI, 2016). Since the Cold War came to a close following the dissolution of the communist Soviet Union in 1991, it has widely been suggested that regional organisations should play more prominent roles on the basis of the subsidiarity principle (Møller, 2005). In the context of conflict resolution mechanism, they are to do so as actors affected the most by and closest to a conflict. However, the application of subsidiarity in practice has resulted in mixed experiences as it is not always clear how the principle should address conflicts of interest between competing organisations and States. Thus in many cases, different actors have for their own interests, advanced competing interpretations of subsidiarity (ECCAS-CMI, 2016).

In the European Union (EU), the subsidiarity principle made its first appearance in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (officially called the Treaty on European Union (TEU)) in Article 5(3) (Staden, 2016). But in Africa, though there exists in principle a subsidiarity relationship between the AU and RECs, the nature of this relationship in reality is not well-defined (Ajayi, 2008). One of the reasons why this has been the case is that, the principle of subsidiarity has not been formally codified by the AU in its Constitutive Act like the EU did in its Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, in the 2002 Protocol of the PSC, the role of sub-regional bodies is duly recognised in the African peace and security architecture (Møller, 2005).

2. Theoretical Framework

In the discipline ‘International Relations’, there exist a number of mainstream theories that touch on international organisations and international security. But for the study of ‘African Union – Regional Economic Communities Relations in the African Peace and Security Architecture: A Synergy or Competition?’ the most appropriate theory is the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is a theory of international security which was expounded by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever of the Copenhagen School. Initially, Buzan defined security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1983:106 cited in Buzan and Waever, 2003:44). But some years later, he and Waever, in order to make room for the several sectors of security, redefined Regional Security Complex (RSC) as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 201 cited in Buzan and Waever, 2003:44).

“The regional security complex (RSC) model rests on the interdependence among the key nation-al security interests of a geographically compact group of states” (Eyvavoz, 2011:17). In other words, it is defined by “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence” (Buzan and Waever, 2003:45). ‘Amity’ here means the inter-state relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectation of protection or support, while ‘enmity’, refers to the inter-state relationships conditioned by suspicion and fear (Stivachtis, 2018).

In the post-Cold War era, several regional and sub-regional organisations have been linked to RSC. In Africa, the AU and RECs have at various degrees been involved in the security interdependence of African States. Following the signing of the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) in 1981 by ECOWAS Member States, ECOWAS, the most experienced/successful REC in the safeguarding of peace and security in Africa, formed the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. By the year 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. In June, 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics, Security, and Defence Cooperation was launched while, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was formed in December, 2003. These and a number of Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) on the continent have to an extent played a role in Africa’s security dynamic.

3. The Formation and Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU)

The origin of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been traced to the Pan African Congresses abroad and the nationalist movements in Africa. From October 15-21, 1945, the Pan African Congress in Manchester, England, brought together Pan Africanists such as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore and, African nationalists – Dr. Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta etc (Mangwende, 1984/85; Bujra, 2004). In the Congress, they “gave the clearest expression of Africa’s vision in the following terms: (a) to achieve independence from colonial rule throughout the continent so that Africans can rule themselves democratically; (b) to achieve continental unity so that Africa can: (i) bring about faster economic growth and development to catch up with the industrialised countries, and (ii) be strong within the international system” (Bujra, 2004:2).

Following the Manchester Congress of 1945, Kwame Nkrumah became an indefatigable promoter of Pan Africanism in Africa, organising conferences that echoed the goals of the Pan-African Congress which included solidarity and the political independence of African territories (Esedebe, 1994 cited in Munya, 1999:541). From April 15-22, 1958, the maiden Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) held in Accra, Ghana, with eight independent African countries in attendance – Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. In the conference, the eight countries not only condemned colonialism and racism in Africa but, discussed how they could better safeguard their political independence as sovereign States and, assist African territories still under colonial rule in attaining self-determination (Bakhashab, 1984; Mangwende, 1984/85; Adejo, 2001; Cragg, 2008). What followed after this conference was the balkanisation of the independent African States into three turned two ideological factions.

On October 24, 1960, the conservative Brazzaville bloc, a group of former French territories – Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Madagascar, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, and Chad, held its first meeting in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. As a group of French speaking countries, it was more interested in harmonising their economic policies and maintaining cordial relations with their former colonial master, France. They subsequently met on March 27, 1961, at Yaoundé, Cameroon, where they formed the African and Malagasy Organisation for Economic Co-operation (Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Co-operation Economique (OAMCE) and on the 12th of September, 1961, in Tananarive, Malagasy, they agreed to found the African and Malagasy Union (Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM)) (Sanders 1979 cited in Bakhashab, 1984:4-5; Adejo, 2001). On the burning issues in Africa, the conservative Brazzaville group was known for siding with France against the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria while in the Congo crisis of 1960, the group supported President Joseph Kasavubu and Moïse Tshombe.

On January 03, 1961, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and the Provisional Government of Algeria, met in a conference in Casablanca, Morocco. On

January 07, the last day of the conference, they signed an 'African Charter' which signalled the creation of the second group – the radical Casablanca or 'Progressive' bloc. Led by the socialist, Kwame Nkrumah, the Casablanca bloc which envisioned the establishment of an African Consultative Assembly, called for a 'Union Government of Africa' i.e. the integration Africa's sub-regions to form a political federation of African States (Sanders 1979 cited in Bakhashab, 1984:6; Mangwende, 1984/85). Unlike the Brazzaville group, the Casablanca group supported the FLN's fight for the independence of Algeria and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in the Congo crisis.

The third group – the conservative Monrovia group was formed in a conference that held from May 08-12, 1961, in Monrovia, Liberia. The group was made up of Liberia, Somalia, Togo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Libya, Tunisia plus the 12 States in the Brazzaville group, which made the Monrovia bloc technically the second bloc after the Casablanca bloc and, the bloc with the majority. The Monrovia group had a moderate approach to African States integration. As a bloc, it preferred the gradual integration of independent African States, beginning with economic integration at the sub-regions and thereafter, political integration (Biswaro, 2004 cited in Kolbeck, 2014:11).

From May 15-22, 1963, was the Addis Ababa Conference of Foreign Ministers from 30 independent African States. The foreign ministers convened to draft the Charter of the OAU as well as set the agenda of the Heads of State and Government Summit. On the 23rd of May, 1963, 32 African countries attended the summit which was convoked by His Majesty, Haile Selassie, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The outcome of the summit was the signing and adoption of the Charter of the OAU on the 25th of May, 1963. It must be pointed out here that the said Charter was born out of the radical Casablanca bloc and moderate Monrovia-Brazzaville bloc compromise (Bakhashab, 1984; Adejo, 2001; Cragg, 2008).

Following the eradication of colonialism and racism in Africa, there was the need to reform the regional body to one that is capable of addressing the 21st century socio-economic, political and security challenges of the continent (Ogunnoiki, 2018b). The reform process started in the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria in July, 1999 "where Heads of State and Government took stock of what the OAU had achieved during the period of its existence" (Nmehielle, 2003:415). On September 09, 1999, Muammar Gaddafi (who rekindled Nkrumah's Pan Africanism with his call for a 'United States of Africa') played host to African Heads of State and Government in the 4th Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya. The Summit was to deliberate on how the continental body can be made more effective, that it may keep up with the social, economic and political development taking place in Africa and abroad. Subsequently, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) was signed on the 11th of July, 2000, at the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lomé, Togo. At the 5th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from 1–2 March, 2001 in Sirte, Libya, it was decided that the AU would legally be formed following the ratification of the Constitutive Act by 36 Member States (i.e. 2/3 of the OAU Member States). On April 26, 2001, Nigeria became the 36th Member State to deposit its instrument of

ratification. However, it was not until the 9th of July, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, that the AU was officially inaugurated as the successor of the OAU (Adejo, 2001; Nmehielle, 2003; Bah *et al*, 2014; Adetula 2015; African Union Commission, 2015). In the year 2012, the benevolent People's Republic of China (PRC) built and gifted to Africa the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to the tune of \$200 million (Ogunnoiki, 2018b).

Since the transformation of the OAU to the AU, there is no doubt that the AU has demonstrated an encouraging pro-activeness in terms of its preparedness to tackle the continent's peace and security challenges, and generally contributing to issues relating to the attainment of international peace and security (Aning, 2008).

4. African Union – Regional Economic Communities Relations in the African Peace and Security Architecture: A Synergy or Competition?

There are basically three peace and security challenges that have cemented the AU-RECs relations in the APSA. The first is the intermittent civil wars and conflicts in the sub-regions of the continent. Between the early 1960s and 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), there were horrendous civil wars, crisis and, genocide – the Congo crisis (1960-1961), the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970); Liberian Civil War (1989-1996, 1999-2003), the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) and, the Rwanda genocide (1994). In the Liberian and Sierra Leone Civil War, war crimes against humanity were committed – the maiming of civilians hands and limbs, and the rape of women. In the avoidable 1994 Rwanda genocide, about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu's lives were lost (Ogunnoiki, 2018c).

The second is the rampant plot and execution of coup d'état by military officers in African countries. Since Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt led the 'Free Officers' to carry out the first coup d'état in Africa and indeed the world, which dethroned the monarch, King Farouk I, on July 23, 1952, there has been a 'bush-fire' effect in Africa – Sudan (1958), Algeria (1965), Congo (Brazzaville) (1963), Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa) (1965), Central African Republic (1966), Togo (1963), Benin (Dahomey) (1963), Ghana (1966), Nigeria (1966) (Frank and Ukpere, 2012). With the passing of time, many scholars and analysts alike began to see military coups as a thing of the past, especially after what Samuel Huntington (1991) called the "third wave" of democratisation in the 20th century. Unfortunately, there has been a repeat of the unconstitutional change of government in the 21st century. "Since 2008, coups have taken place in Mauritania (August 2008), Guinea (December 2008), Madagascar (March 2009), Niger (February 2010), Mali (March 2012), Guinea-Bissau (April 2012) and Central African Republic (2013). The Arab Spring also resulted in a series of regime changes across North Africa from 2011, to which the AU and the sub-regional organisations concerned have often struggled to find a coherent response" (Brett, 2013:4).

Lastly is the evil seed of terrorism sown across neighbouring States porous border and in politically unstable countries on the continent. In North Africa, the Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from the Middle East is now active in the politically unstable Libyan State. From North Africa to West Africa is the Salafi terrorist group, al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which carries out its operation in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger, Mauritania etc. From West Africa to Central Africa is Abubakar Skekau's Boko Haram which is active in North East Nigeria and has launched attacks in Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Still in Central Africa is Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Christian rebel group that operates like a terrorist organisation in Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and, the Central African Republic (CAR). To the Horn of Africa is the Salafi terrorist group, al-Shaabab, which has launched attacks in Somalia, Uganda and Kenya.

In order to deal with the aforementioned peace and security challenges in a coordinated fashion, AU-RECs operations has been regulated by different legal instruments. They include "the Abuja Treaty (1991) establishing the African Economic Community (AEC); the AU Constitutive Act (2000); and the Protocol on the Relations between AU and RECs (2008), adopted eight years after the Constitutive Act and seventeen years after the Abuja Treaty" (Momodu, 2017:1). "Since May 1994 (when it became effective), the AEC has been working closely with sub-regional groups in search of means towards achieving its ambitious aims. Some of the examples of these sub-regional groups in Africa include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community" (Kimunguyi, 2006:5).

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) as the second legal document states in Article 3(1) that it is the objective of the AU to "coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union" (African Union Constitutive Act, 2000). Furthermore, the relationship between the AU and RECs/RMs was mentioned in the 2002 Protocol related to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and, the June 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security.

Article 16 of the 2002 Protocol of PSC recognised RMs as a part of the APSA. The PSC and the chairperson of the Commission are to harmonise and coordinate RMs activities vis-à-vis the peace and security in Africa, work closely with them for effective partnership on Africa peace and security, and on a regularly basis exchange information in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent. The 2008 MoU on the other hand only elaborated the relationship between the AU and RECs with the mention of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage as operational principles (African Union PSC Protocol, 2002; Franke, 2007; African Union Commission, 2015; ECCAS-CMI, 2016).

Over the years, the AU, based on the principle of subsidiarity, has to an extent had fruitful relations with RECs. This new development of a cooperative and not a competitive engagement with RECs has set the AU apart from its predecessor (OAU) that often ran into difficulties co-existing with the various RECs on the continent (Franke, 2007). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded on May 28, 1975, with the primary mandate of improving regional economic integration in West Africa. However, the onset of civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone underscored the indispensability of peace and

political stability to successful economic integration, which caused a shift from economic to political priorities. It has been recorded that the ECOWAS has deployed its Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia (1990-1998, 2003-2006), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1999), and Côte d'Ivoire (2003) (Ajayi, 2008).

In the Malian crisis of 2012, it became obvious that the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS was more of a cooperative engagement than a competition. Following the overthrow of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, many of the Tuaregs that fought in Libya returned back home with their arms and ammunition. On January 17, 2012, the Tuaregs of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) defeated the Malian Army in the Northern part of the country. Thus, on the 22nd of March, 2012, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo staged a coup d'état that ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power (Na, 2016). The sole reason given for the execution of the coup was the failure of Touré's administration to fund and equip the military with sophisticated weapons to combat the separatists in the Northern part of Mali. Between March and April, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao fell and came under the control of the Tuaregs. With the crisis ongoing, the Islamic terrorist groups – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine took advantage of it to have a foothold in the country. Ansar Dine for example enforced Sharia law and destroyed historical monuments (mausoleums) in Timbuktu.

ECOWAS, being the closest to the crisis, responded appropriately by condemning the coup as well as setting up the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA) before the African Union took over with the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Although it was a tensed transition from MICEMA to AFISMA, ECOWAS and the AU worked together that they might have a united front and a collaborative response to the Malian crisis on the basis of the subsidiarity principle in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Théroux-Bénoni 2013 cited in Cocodia, 2016:4). In 2013, AFISMA metamorphosed to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Concluding Remarks

No doubt, there is an existing hierarchical relationship between the AU and RECs on the peace and security of the continent's sub-regions. Following the transformation of the OAU to the AU, the continental body has unlike its predecessor synergised more with the eight RECs it recognises than engage them in an unhealthy zero-sum game competition in war/conflict/crisis intervention. This was clearly seen in the Malian crisis of 2012 where the AU and ECOWAS, though had a hitch relating at first, finally cooperated based on the subsidiarity principle in managing the crisis. Hence, it is safe to answer the research question of this paper that, the AU-RECs relations has been more of a synergy than a competition in the African peace and security architecture.

References

- Adejo, A. M. (2001). From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottles?. *AJIA*, 4(1 & 2), 119-141.
- Adetula, V. A. O. (2015). *African Conflicts, Development and Regional Organisations in the Post-Cold War International System*. The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala University.
- African Union Commission (2015). *APSA Roadmap 2016-2020*. Peace and Security Department. Addis Ababa: Ethiopia.
- African Union Constitutive Act (2000).
- African Union Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002).
- Ajayi, T. (2008). The UN, the AU and ECOWAS – A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa?. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Briefing Paper 11*, 1-9.
- Ancas, S. (2011). The Effectiveness of Regional Peace-making in Southern Africa – Problematising the United Nations-African Union-Southern African Development Community relationship. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 11(1), 129-152.
- Aning, K. (2008). *The African Union's Peace and Security Architecture: Defining an Emerging Response Mechanism*. Lecture Series on African Security. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), 1-13.
- Bah, S., Choge-Nyangoro, E., Dersso, S., Mofya, B. & Murithi, T. (2014). *The African Peace and Security Architecture: A Handbook*. Addis Ababa Office: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the African Union (AU).
- Bakhashab, O. A. (1984). *The Organisation of African Unity and Regional Disputes: A Study of African Conflicts*. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Glasgow. Retrieved December 23, 2018, from <http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5122/>
- Berhe M. G. & Waal, A. (2015). *Peace Missions in Africa: Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities*. Preliminary Report to the African Union. *World Peace Foundation*, 1-40.
- Brett, J. (2013). *The Inter-relationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and Regional Initiatives*. A Report for the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa, 1-37.

- Bujra, A. (2004). Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Development from the OAU to the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). *Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)*, DPMF Occasional Paper No.13, 1-34.
- Buzan, B. & Waeber, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cragg, K. (2008). Organizing African Unity: a Pan-African Project A Comparison of the Organization of African Unity And the African Union. Unpublished B.A Thesis, Wesleyan University.
- Cocodia, J. (2016). The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict and the African Standby Force: Options for Peace Intervention in Africa. *Social Science Research Council Work Papers*, 1-34
- ECCAS-CIM (2016). The Principle of Subsidiary: The Example of ECCAS in Central African Crisis, 1-23.
- Elowson, C. & Albuquerque, A. L. (2016). Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF. *Studies in African Security*, FOI.
- Eyvavoz, J. (2011). Some Aspects of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as Applied to Studies of the Political System in the Post-Soviet Space. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 12(2), 17-24.
- Fanta, E. (2009). The Capacity of African Regional Organisations in Peace and Security. A paper presented at the ERD Workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms, Florence, 16-17 April.
- Follesdal, A. (2011). The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law. *The Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice*, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/11, 1-33.
- Frank, E. O. & Ukpere, W. I. (2012). The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria. *J Soc Sci*, 33(3), 285-292.
- Franke, B. F. (2007). Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture. *African Studies Quarterly*, 9(3), 31-64.

- Graser, R. & Mateos, O. (2010). Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: an Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence. *Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP)*, ICIP Working Papers 08, 3-43.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kimunguyi, P. (2006). Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union. Being a refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference University of Newcastle, Australia, 25-27 September.
- Kokolo, W. (2015). The Role of the EU in the African Peace and Security Architecture: An Evaluation of African Peace Facility-Funded Activities. *The Jean Monnet Papers of Political Economy*, 1-18.
- Kolbeck, B. (2014). Legal Analysis on the Relationship between the AU/AEC and RECs: Africa Lost in a “Spaghetti Bowl” of Legal Relations?. Published LL.M Thesis, University of Cape Town.
- Mangwende, W. (1984/85). The OAU: An Analysis of the Function, Problems and Prospects of the Organization. *Zambezia*, XII, 21-38.
- Møller, B. (2005). The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organisations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa. DIIS Working Paper, No.4, 1-66.
- Momodu, R. (2017). African Integration: Resetting the AU-REC Relationship – Policy Options Beyond the Kagame Reform. African Peace Building Network (APN) Briefing Note 14, Social Science Research Council (SCRC).
- Munya, P. M. (1999). The Organization of African Unity and Its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation. *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 19(2), 537-592.
- Na, A. W. (2016). Responsibilities and Challenges of the African Union in Maintaining Continental Peace and Security: A Case Study of the Malian Crisis. *Arts Social Science Journal*, 7(4), 1-25.
- Nmehielle, V. O. (2003). The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human Rights Protection in Africa?. *Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 7, 412-446

- Ogunnoiki, A. O. (2018a). United States and Nigeria's Foreign Policy under George W. Bush Jr. and Olusegun Obasanjo: A Comparison. *International Journal of Advanced Academic Research (IJAAR)*, 4(10) 43-74.
- Ogunnoiki, A. O. (2018b). The Emergence of China as a Global Power and the South China Sea Disputes; A Peaceful Rise or a Threat to International Order?. *International Journal of Advanced Academic Research (IJAAR)*, 4(4), 48-78.
- Ogunnoiki, A. O. (2018c). Reforming the United Nations in the 21st Century: A Discourse on the Enlargement, Democratisation and the Working Methods of the Security Council. *International Journal of Advanced Academic Research (IJAAR)*, 4(6), 40-70
- Staden, A. (2016). Subsidiarity in Regional Integration Regimes in Latin America and Africa. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 79(27), 27-52.
- Stivanchtis, Y. A. (2018). "Introduction" in Stivanchtis, Y. A. (ed.). *Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East: External Actors and Regional Rivalries*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.
- Van Hoeymissen, S. (2011). Regional Organizations in China's Security Strategy for Africa: The Sense of Supporting "African Solutions to African Problems". *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 4, 91-118.